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Special legal provisions on preferential treatment of expatriates 
introduced during last decade by the kin-states are oftentimes 
construed by the scholars as visible sings and effective tools of 
new, post-territorial nation-building in Eastern Europe. However, 
the analysis of Serbian and Kosovan laws on citizenship and 
diaspora shows that the picture is more complex, whereas the 
situation varies across countries of the region. Despite the rising 
concerns with the issues of the co-ethnics since late 2000 the 
Serbian government for some years has been reluctant to 
introduce the exclusive preferential treatment for the Serbs in the 
realm of citizenship. Only the law passed in 2009 overtly showed 
that the executives and legislators of the Republic of Serbia now 
are on the way of creating post-territorial Serb national 
community. Contrariwise the political establishment of Kosovo 
equally pushing forward special laws on “diaspora” in 2008 and 
2011 was rather concerned with forming and reasserting of as well 
as tightening its grip over post-territorial citizenry because of 
notable social and economic problems. In contrast to Easter 
European status laws, trans-border “ethnic relatives” of the 
Kosovan majority are effectively excluded by the documents from 
the membership in the “diaspora,” while the representatives of 
ethnic minorities from the territory of the country legally qualify 
for being Kosovo diasporans. 
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The last decade witnessed the adoption in a number of Eastern European 
countries of special laws on preferential treatment of expatriates and out-of-
country nationals enabling them eased access to social benefits and citizenship. 
Some scholars of these recent legal developments speak of certain regional 
“syndrome,” and remark clearly visible tendency of the advent of a “new,” 
“post-territorial” nation-building, which is going to undermine the sovereignty 
of the existing East European states over their citizenry. In their eyes, a novel 
masked form of state nationalism will negatively affect Eastern Europe, or even 
the whole “Eurasian mega-area,” in the next decades. 
The problem with this approach, in my view, is that the time has not come 
yet to make definite predictions. It seems too hasty to pick up some cases from 
the region, and the Hungarian one in the first place, and then to generalize 
expanding the findings onto the giant political geography. Prophesying the  
unstoppable process of new nation-building, because of a political and social 
“syndrome” means to bring water on the old argument about a specific, 
aggressive, malicious and parochial, Eastern nationalism, which can not be 
eradicated from the deviant area of “Slavic Eurasia.” 
Drawing on the analysis of recent legal developments in the field of diaspora 
and citizenship in Serbia and Kosovo, I will show in the present paper that 
even though one can theorize on post-territorial nation-building in Eastern 
Europe, the process is neither one-ended nor universal here. First of all, the 
laws on expatriates are not always used as the ways of building a nation. 
Secondly, even if the later is the case, the launch of “new nation-building” is 
highly dependent on political and social circumstances, i.e. party politics, 
international position of political entity, and economic situation etc. It thus can 
be changed. Thirdly, being located in Eastern Europe does not automatically 
mean being conducive to the pursuit of post-territorial nationalist policies via 
laws on expatriates residing abroad.     
 
1.1. “Status law syndrome”: a background 
The unanimous adoption of the Status law by the Hungarian Parliament in 
June 2001 stirred up the sensitivities of the neighboring countries concerned 
with the issues of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and social cohesion. The 
controversial legal initiative taken by the Hungarian political establishment as 
well as its ensuing intention to introduce the non-residual citizenship for the 
Hungarians living abroad, as Szabolcs Pogonyi argues, because of the historical 
context have been construed by many in Romania and Slovakia as a visible sing 
of revival of Hungarian revisionist politics (Pogonyi 2011: 697). Opposing these 
attempts of the kin-state to revise the belonging of the Hungarian minorities in 
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adjacent foreign lands, the Romanian government resorted to legal means 
offered by the Council of Europe and on 21 June 2001 appealed to the European 
Commission for Democracy for the later to examine if the Hungarian law could 
be considered as compatible with European norms. In response on 2 July the 
Hungarian government asked the Commission to investigate the conformity of 
all status laws, in addition to Hungarian one (Osamu 2004: 41–42). The report 
compiled by the Venice Commission in October 2001 revealed the existence of a 
quite elaborated legislation on the “expatriate ‘co-nationals’” and/or 
“compatriots” in Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Slovakia and Slovenia (The Venice Commission 2001: 8–9). Moreover, it was 
also noticed that Poland was about to establish her own status law, whereas 
some “old” European states, such as Germany, Italy, Britain, Portugal, and 
Spain, widely practiced the preferential treatment of the emigrants easing 
acquisition of citizenship for the persons of corresponding ethnic descent 
(Kovacs 2005: 66–67). 
The Hungarian status law in line with the common practice prompted by its 
analogues in another European countries was designed to establish “a form of 
state membership, or “Hungarian status” for trans-border Hungarians” 
expressed in the form of a special Identity Card (Kovacs 2005: 53–54, 56; Joppke 
2003: 442–454). Although the document allowed more or less inclusive 
definition of a Hungarian, including self-declaration as one, after the 
Hungarian Standing Conference held in October 2001 the authorities in charge 
of issuing the certificates were supposed to follow much clearer criteria: 
mastering the Hungarian language, membership in a registered Hungarian 
organization, designation as Hungarian in church documents or treatment as 
Hungarian by the country of citizenship. The later features of the definition of 
Hungarianness brought about by the status law as well as in-country debates 
around the law itself and foreseen dual non-resident citizenship fostered Ieda 
Osamu and Maria Kovacs to maintain that the provisions had an ethno-
nationalist underpinning (Osamu 2004: 54–56; Kovacs 2005: 60–61). 
Given the spread of the legal mechanisms directed to national minorities in 
Eastern Europe Ieda Osamu assumes that the “status law syndrome” marked 
the advent of “a ‘new nation-building’, one which differed decisively from the 
previous one in requiring no territorial changes” (Osamu 2004: 5). This 
allegedly appears to be particularly characteristic in the Eastern European 
region, or even in “the Slavic Eurasian mega-area,” where among the others 
“the largest kin-minority in post-communist Europe, ‘the Russian diaspora’, is 
a sleeping volcano for almost all other CIS countries” (Osamu 2004: 57). 
Francesco Ragazzi and Kristina Balalovska, whose paper assesses the 
situation with the “diaspora” and dual citizenship politics in the region of my 
current concern – South-Eastern Europe – employ the same approach: “After 
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one of the most brutal civil wars on European soil – a war focused on the 
acquisition and ethnic cleansing of territories, the importance of this key feature 
of the Westphalian nation-state is, paradoxically, vanishing. Soon after the 
independence of Croatia, and during the past decade in the cases of Serbia and 
Macedonia, these states began building a conception of national belonging that 
is increasingly disconnected from the people’s presence on the national 
territory: citizenship is largely distributed amongst the “diaspora,” ministries 
and governmental agencies are dedicated to the relation with the co-ethnics 
abroad…, and citizens abroad are increasingly included in votes for 
parliamentary and presidential elections” (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011: 1). The 
scholars then claim that the understanding of the nation in the Balkans remains 
ethnic, even if is being reframed: “[R]ather than traditional contradiction 
between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ conceptions of political communities, we suggest 
that what is at stake in the post-Yugoslav space is a struggle between two forms 
of ‘ethnic’ political programs of community: a territorial one and a post-
territorial one” (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011: 2). 
In my view to regard the laws on the expatriates (“diaspora”, national 
minorities, co-nationals, compatriots), which emerged in the recent decades as 
mere tools of a “new”, post-territorial nation-building, means to oversimplify 
current legal developments. Indeed, Maria Kovacs notices that in the realm of 
dual citizenship there are some sound distinctions between West European and 
East European preferential legal policies vis-à-vis co-ethnics and co-nationals: 
“Within Europe, such policies are pursued by a number of countries including 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. More recently, several countries in the East 
Central European region, among them, Croatia and Romania have introduced 
similar legislation. However, while such reforms in Western and East-Central 
Europe may look similar in terms of the legal techniques involved, they are 
intended to address different concerns and thus carry different political and 
social implications” (Kovacs 2005: 53). While Western Europe citizenship 
reforms pertaining to the preferential treatment of ethnic relatives abroad have 
predominantly emerged in the context of migration and have been directed to 
potential overseas citizens, the demand for dual citizenship in Hungary and 
many other states of the region mainly concerned trans-border national 
minorities” (Kovacs 2005: 53, 71). Here, I will argue that even the laws on 
expatriates enacted in East European countries can be construed more 
diversely, and sometimes have little to do with any nation building. 
 
1.2 The Serbian Legislation on the Expatriates 
The Serbian governmental concerns with the issue of expatriates, as 
Francesco Ragazzi and Kristina Balalovska cogently argue, represent a 
relatively belated phenomenon. Under Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian officials 
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were reluctant to acknowledge any preferential treatment to co-nationals. The 
Serbian trans-border political field was perceived to be more favorable to the 
parties at the right of Milosevic or at the center. Only the removal of Milosevic 
from power in 2000 marked a decisive shift in the politics of citizenship and 
belonging in Serbia. The later years witnessed an increasing preoccupation of 
the Serbian political establishment with “diaspora” issues (Ragazzi and 
Balalovska 2011: 12–14). In 2003 the special Ministry for Diaspora (Serb. 
Ministarstvo za dijasporu) was established in order to ensure the status of 
citizens residing abroad and enhance the relationship of the expatriates and 
persons of Serbian origin with the Republic of Serbia. In subsequent years the 
institution was renamed Ministry of Religion and Diaspora (Serb. Ministarstvo 
vera i dijaspore), which now revealed clear ethno-cultural understanding of the 
Serbianness expressed in common descent, shared history, language and 
religious affiliation with the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Sector for 
enhancement of the conditions for churches and religious communities, 
religious education and teaching was, among other things, vested with the task 
to ensure the affirmation of religious foundations and components of the 
Serbian national identity, the cooperation of the state with the Serbian 
Orthodox Church abroad in the field of sustaining and developing the spiritual, 
national and cultural uniqueness of the Serb people outside of the Republic of 
Serbia (Ministarstvo vera i dijaspore). The ethnic interpretation of the Serb 
nationness resonated with one that has been elaborated since the dawn of Serb 
nationalism (see: Belov 2007). 
One of the first legal documents touching upon the issue and establishing 
the preferential stance of the government vis-à-vis Serbian expatriates was the 
Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia passed in 2004 under the impulse 
of “diaspora” organizations and the Ministry for Diaspora (Ministry of Interior 
2008). Article 18 foresaw an eased procedure of the acquisition of Serbian 
citizenship for the emigrants and their descendants: “An emigrant and his 
descendant can be admitted to citizenship of the Republic of Serbia if they are 
18 and if they are not deprived of working capacity and if they submit a written 
statement that they consider the Republic of Serbia their own state”. This 
provision from the legal point of view had little to do with Serb ethno-cultural 
nation-building, since the persons concerned rather were to be granted 
citizenship on the basis of jus sanguinis irrespectively of their ethnic 
background. For them even the requirement of mastering Serbian was lifted. 
Neither article 23 could be seen as an apparent nation-building force, because it 
welcomed all ethnic groups from Serbia (even though the Serbs in the first 
place) to apply for citizenship: “A member of Serbian or another nation or 
ethnic group from the territory of the Republic of Serbia, who is not residing in 
the territory of the Republic of Serbia, can be admitted to citizenship of the 
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Republic of Serbia if he is 18 years old and if he is not deprived of working 
capacity and if he submits a written statement considering the Republic of 
Serbia his own state“. According to the law no proof of language skills and no 
declaration of belonging to a nation were required. 
By 2009, when the parliament established the Law on Diaspora and the 
Serbs in the Region (Ministarstvo vera i dijaspore 2009), Serbian politicians 
went further on the path of ethno-cultural nation-building. The document 
clearly defined “who is who”. Despite it included into “diaspora” all the 
Serbian citizens residing abroad, a non-citizen might be considered as 
diasporan or out-of-country Serb, only if s/he belonged to the Serb 
people/nation (in terms of ethnic group – srpski narod), who emigrated from 
Serbia or the region, or was the descendant of such person. The Serbs in the 
region meant those constituents of the Serb people who lived in Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Albania 
and Hungary (Article 3). 
The law aimed at maintenance, strengthening and creating ties between kin-
state, diaspora and the Serbs in the region stipulated that all points could and 
should be carried out through the conclusion of respective bilateral and 
multilateral international agreements, increasing funding secured by the kin-
state, and economic cooperation between kin-state and diaspora. Particular 
attention should be also paid to “the use, preservation and enhancement of 
Serbian language and Cyrillic script, maintenance and fostering of the Serb cultural, 
ethnic, linguistic and religious identity”. The special national rewards for “sound 
contribution to the maintenance and strengthening of the ties between the kin-
state and the diaspora, as well as between the kin-state and the Serbs in the 
region” were established (Article 4, emphasis added). All of the later receive the 
names of ethnic Serb historical figures (except for the most prestigious “Mother 
Serbia,” which, however, is even more outspoken) (Article 42). The rights of 
diasporans to learn Serbian and Cyrilic script deserved specific provisions 
(Article 37). The law determined to mark the Day of Diaspora on 28 June each 
year (Vidovdan), thus appealing to famous events that occurred in the Kosovo 
field in 1389, whose interpretations have been so crucial for Serb Orthodox 
legends and later for (ethno)national mythology (Article 13). The document 
foresaw financial mechanisms (Article 5, 6), created the Diaspora Assembly 
(Articles 16–22) and three councils to assist it: The Economic Council, The 
Status Council, The Council for Culture, Education, Science and Sport (Articles 
24–26). The Republic of Serbia, on her part, formed the Council for the 
Relations with the Serbs in the Region (Articles 27–33) and the Budgetary Fund 
for Diaspora and the Serbs in the Region (Articles 34–36). 
Given that the notion of the Serb nation was profoundly ingrained into the 
Law on Diaspora and the Serbs in the region, it definitely deserves to be 
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characterized as a tool of new, post-territorial nation-building. Even though 
despite the rising concerns with the issues of the co-ethnics since late 2000 the 
Serbian government for some years has been reluctant to introduce the 
exclusive preferential treatment for the Serbs in the realm of citizenship, the 
law passed in 2009 overtly showed that the executives and legislators of the 
Republic of Serbia now are on the way of creating a post-territorial Serb 
national community. 
 
1.3. Kosovans residing abroad in legislation of the Republic of Kosovo 
The Law on Kosovo Citizenship became one of the first legal documents 
both to appear right after the Declaration of independence (passed on 20 
February 2008) and to define the status of the diaspora of the newly-proclaimed 
state (Kuvendi i Republikes se Kosoves 2008). It considered as a member of the 
diaspora “any person, who permanently and legally resides outside the 
Republic of Kosovo, but proves that s/he was born on the territory of the 
Republic of Kosovo and maintains close economic and family ties in [to] the 
Republic of Kosovo.” Otherwise s/he should be an offspring of the mentioned 
person in the first generation in order to qualify. The law stipulated an eased 
procedure of the naturalization for the diasporans: no reach of the majority age, 
regular residence for 5 years, financial self-sufficiency and knowledge of one of 
the official languages (e.g. Albanian or Serbian) were required, and mere accep-
tance of the republican constitutional and legal order was enough (Article 13). 
In May 2011 the Kosovo prime-minister Hashim Thaçi announced the 
establishment of the Ministry of Diaspora. Later on, in the summer of the same 
year the government drafted the law on the diaspora, which, however, has not 
yet been approved by the Assembly (Qeveria e Republikes se Kosoves 2011). Its 
main objective is “to influence the maintenance and cultivation of linguistic, 
cultural and educational [sic!] identity of the members of the diaspora” (Article 
1) and applies to various states, where the Kosovan diaspora lives” (Article 2). 
By the member of the diaspora the draft understands “any person, who resides 
outside Kosovo and has family origins from the Republic of Kosovo” (Article 
2). The Ministry of Diaspora and the Kosovo cultural centers for diaspora are 
considered the main institutions for pursuit of policies in the interest of the 
diaspora members (Article 4). Among other things, the ministry is supposed to 
work on and help fostering the consciousness of the diaspora, as well as to 
assist in the promotion of cultural, linguistic and educational (sic!) identity of 
the Republic of Kosovo in the states where the diaspora lives (Article 6). The 
law foresees financial mechanisms to secure the operation of the cultural 
centers (Article 11), outlines the ways of enhancing the learning and teaching of 
official and semi-official languages of Kosovo (Article 12), promotion of culture, 
historical legacy and spurring of full-scale cooperation between the state and 
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the diaspora (Articles 13–15). Thus, from the legal standpoint, both the law on 
citizenship and that on diaspora conceive of Kosovo expatriates (diasporans) as 
emigrants from Kosovo independently of their ethnic background, whereas the 
membership in the diaspora accrues on the basis of both the jus soli and jus 
sanguinis principles. However, even in the later case what is transmitted across 
generations is the belonging to the territorially bounded collectivity. 
In view of such legal provisions, one finds it difficult to interpret recent 
concerns of the Kosovo politicians with Kosovans living abroad as new, post 
territorial nation-building. The fact of the matter is that Kosovo neither legally 
nor ideologically, nor even notionally represents a nation-state. The 
constitution portrays the partially recognized polity as “a homeland to all of its 
citizens” (Preamble) and “a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian [not 
Kosovar, Kosovar Albanian or something of this sort] and other Communities, 
governed democratically with full respect for the rule of law through its 
legislative, executive and judicial institutions” (Article 3). Likewise in the case 
with the local Serbs, the Albanians from Kosovo, who make about 90 % of the 
population, constitute an integral part of the broader Albanian nation 
traditionally understood as a community of descent, shared history, language 
and customs, i.e. ethno-culturally or even racially (Skendi 1967). The recent 
debates among the Albanian intellectuals and politicians from Kosovo, Albania 
and Macedonia over the particular “Kosovar” (sub)national identity of the 
Kosovan Albanians as well as the propositions to bring changes into the 
standard Albanian/Kosovar language in the country drawing partially on local 
dialects have not yet changed much in this respect (Kush asht kosovar? 2005; 
Novik 2008). Therefore, there is currently no nation, which all the diasporans 
(expatriates) as understood under the Kosovo law could belong to or constitute 
a part of. 
Naturally, some might claim that what finds the expression in the laws on 
Kosovo citizenship and on diaspora is new Albanian nation-building. Indeed, 
the Ministry of Diaspora predominantly operates in the field of strengthening 
ties between the state and the Kosovar Albanians abroad, both in neighboring 
countries and beyond, as well as clearly engages in the promotion of Albanian 
language and culture (Ministria e diaspores). One indicative fact is that the 
ministry congratulates diasporans on both Muslim and Catholic feasts. The 
telegram sent by the minister Ibrahim Makolli on 3 April 2012 and addressed to 
the Catholic expatriates on the occasion of the Easter celebrations, was not 
followed by one directed to the Orthodox (Makolli 2012). Although there are 
more Orthodox Kosovans (6% of the population) than Catholics (3%), the 
Orthodox faith is not spread among Kosovar Albanians. Ibrahim Makolli 
himself is occasionally presented in the diasporic press as minister of Albanian 
diaspora (Dibrani 2011). However, even that constituency, which is targeted by 
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the activities of the Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Kosovo, is 
territorially bounded and does not include all the trans-border Albanians in 
Albania, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia proper or overseas. 
There is no doubt that some ethnic Albanian emigrants from or citizens of the 
countries adjacent to Kosovo occasionally attend meetings, cultural events and 
conventions of the Kosovan diaspora, but these happenings are foreseen 
neither by official practice nor by legal provisions. In other words, the 
operational field of the ministry does not cover all Albanian nationals. Less the 
ministry fosters and strengthens the ties across the whole Albanian trans-
nation. 
In my view, apparently what is at stake, when one conceives of the recent 
laws on Kosovo citizenship and diaspora, is rather the obsession of the 
government with the issues of reassertion and formation of both territorial and 
post-territorial, real and alleged or possible citizenry, which can contribute to 
the development of the half-fledged political entity demographically and/or 
economically. Such initiatives can be accounted for specific social, economic 
and political conditions, under which the country has been placed in the last 
decade. Since the beginning of 1990s it has suffered a large-scale emigration. 
The estimations are that during the war (1997–1999) more than 850,000 Kosovar 
Albanians fled or were deported (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011: 13; Judah 2008: 
XVII). After Serbia lost control of Kosovo, some 230, 000 (officially recognized 
figure), mostly Serbs, but also Roma, abandoned the province. The Albanians 
generally returned, but the number of Serbian returnees was scarce (ca. 18, 000). 
The governmental bodies of Kosovo starting from the beginning of the 2000s 
were forced by both current needs and the international community to work on 
ensuring the return of the expellees and emigrants (Judah 2008: 14, 19, 100–
103). The importance of the diaspora issue is also caused by the fact that the 
share of remittances in the country’s overall GDP currently amounts to 11%, 
whereas about 20% of the Kosovan households receive money from relatives 
abroad (UNDP Kosovo 2010: 9). 
 
Conclusion 
Writing the article I was showing that some scholarly interpretations of 
recent legal developments, namely the introduction by kin-states of special 
provisions (e.g. status laws, diaspora laws, new laws on citizenship and voting 
rights) on preferential treatment of their expatriates (e.g. diasporans, 
compatriots, co-nationals, co-ethnics, kin-minorities), are neither well-
grounded nor complete. While a number of scholars construe the said laws as 
visible sings and effective tools of new, post-territorial nation-building in 
Eastern Europe, drawing on an analysis of Serbian and Kosovan legal 
documents I think that the picture is more complex, whereas the situation 
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varies across the countries of the region. Thus, Serbian politicians and 
legislators in 2009 finally embarked on the road of post-territorial nation-
building by means of the law on expatriates. Contrariwise the political 
establishment of Kosovo equally pushing forward special laws on “diaspora” 
was rather concerned with forming and reasserting of as well as tightening its grip 
over post-territorial citizenry because of notable social and economic problems. 
Interestingly enough in sharp contrast to Eastern European status laws, trans-
border ethnic relatives of the Kosovan majority are effectively excluded by the 
documents from the membership in the “diaspora,” while the representatives 
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